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circumstance tending to show the subservience of the em-
ployee, since it is incompatible with the full control of the 
work by another. In the Drillon case it was said that the 
power to discharge is it significant factor in fixing the status 
of employer; that the test is whether the right or authority 
to discharge existed and not whether the employer could have 
exercised it if the employee was physically out of reach. In 
Billig v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, it was determined to 
be the rule in this state that when a master hires out a servant 
to operate an instrumentality, together with the use of the 
instrumentality, he does not. necessarily cease to be the em-
ployer of the servant where he has not relinquished the power 
to discharge him; that in such case the legal effect is that, 
though the hirer directs the servant where to go and what to 
do in the performance of the work, the servant remains in 
the general employment of the master in so far as concerns 
the manner and method of operating the instrumentality. It 
is true that in the Billig case the rule was applied for the 
purpose of placing the blame for regligence in the operation 
of the instrumentality. The liberal interpretation enjoined 
by the pr~visions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, how-
ever, reqUIres that the same rule should apply to determine 
whether the original employer of the servant and the owner 
of the instrumentality is an employer subject to the provisions 
of the act. (Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Industrial 
Acc. Com., supra.) 
[lb] Although in the present case there was a provision 
in the lease that the lessee should employ the drivers of 
equipment leased by it, in actual practice the lessor reserved 
the right to hire and discharge the driver of this particular 
truck. In its own interest the lessor exhibited a special con-
cern for and exercised a general supervision over the method 
of handling the truck, which apparently required special skill 
in operation. It was kept at the yard of the lessor at night 
and was dispatched from there in the morning. From the 
conduct of the parties it is obvious that section 4 of the lease 
was intended to allocate, as between the lessor and lessee re-
sponsibility under the Workmen's Compensation Act 'and 
liability for negligence of the driver toward third perso~s un-
der the doctrine of respondeat superior. . 
[5] In determining the right to death benefits under the 
act it is immaterial that the parties to the lease had entered 
into an agreement that the one or the other should be solely 
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liable. (See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Acc. Com., 8 Ca1.2d 589 [67 P.2d 105).) Such an agree-
ment may not affect the claimants' rights under the. act to 
proceed against either or both the general an? specIal em-
ployer. (American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Industr'Ud 4cc. Com., 
8 Ca1.2d 585 [67 P.2d 103]; Employers' Liab£l~tyAssur. 
Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra; Famous Players etc. 
Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 C~l. 134 [228 P. 5, ?4 
A.L.R. 765]; Diamond Drill Contrachng Co. v .. lndustr~al 
Acc. Com., 199 Cal. 694 (260 P. 862].) . ,., . 
It follows that the commission did not exceed its powers m 
determining that Miller Oil Products was t~fgEme~al em-
ployer of George Ivy at the time involved,. and' m.; ho~dlng the 
petitioner liable for the payment of the. award to. hIS, depen-
dents. 
The award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, d .. , Carter, i, Traynor" 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 20, 1943. 
[L. A. No. 18641. In Bank. Dec. 1, 1943.] 
Estate of LUTHER BRISTOL, Deceased .. AGNES BRIS-
TOL, Appellant, v. EDITH YOUNG, Respo,ndent .. 
[1] 
[2] 
Wills-Oontest-Evidence: Review.-Th~~es' of evidence, 
the weight to be accorded to the evidence,. and the province 
of a reviewing court, are the same in a will contest as in any 
other civil case. 
,Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Oonsideration of Evi-
dence-Resolving Oonflicts: Extent of Power of Oourt • .....,On 
appeal, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor 
of the respondent and all legitimate and reasonable inferences 
indulged to uphold the verdict or findings,.if pos~ible. Where 
the verdict or findings are attacked for msufficlency of the 
evidence, the power of the appellate court begins and ends 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, §§ 504, 508, 554; [2] Apl?cal 
and Error, §§ 1235,1243; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1243; [4] Wills, 












222 ESTATE OF BRISTOL [23 C.2d 
wi~h a determination as to whether there is any substantial 
eVIdence to support them. 
[8] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Consideration of Evidence-
Resolvi~g Conflicts.-Inasmuch as it is common knowledge 
among Judges and lawyers that many cases are determined to 
the satisfaction of trial judges or juries by evidence which is 
overwhelming in its persuasiveness, but which may appear 
~elatlvcly unsubstantial in thc record, appellate courts should, 
if .thcre be any r?asonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the 
eVIdence to sustam a finding, resolve that doubt in favor of 
the finding. 
[4] Wills-Revocation-Destruction-Disappearance of Instru-
m?nt-Presumptions.-The presumption of revocation of a 
wIll by destruction arising from the fact that it was last secn 
and known to have been in the testator's possession but which 
cann~t be fou.n~ after his death, may be rebutted by evidence 
showmg that It IS equally probable that the will was destroyed 
by a person other than the testator, or that the act was not 
done with an intention to revoke the will. 
[5] Id. - Probate - Lost or Destroyed Wills - Evidence - Suffi-
ciency. - The evidence sustained a finding that a lost codicil 
had .neve~ been cancelled or destroyed by the testator and 
Nas m eXIstence at the time of his death, where it could reason-
ably be in~erred that the testator entrusted a large sum of 
money to hIS daughter's husband because the codicil nominated 
her as executrix in place of his wife, where there was testi-
mony that, during his last illness, the wife had stated that 
she would tear up the will if she ever got possession of it; 
where she had knowledge of the codicil and of its contents' 
where she had been informed by the testator that she would 
get nothing out of his estate other than the real property which 
he had deed.ed to her; and where it could be inferred that the 
testator beheved the will was in existence and operative. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of IJos 
Angeles County admitting a will to probate. Myron West-
over, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Jacob Forst and W. P. Smith for Appellant. 
Don Lake and Charles G. Young for Respondent. 
. SCHADE.R, J.-The controlling question on this appeal 
IS the. suffiCIency of the evidellce to support the finding of 
the trIal court that' 'the deceased never cancelled or destroyed 
[4] See 26 Cal.Jur. 807. 
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the codicil of April 28th, 1941, and said codicil ~M in exist-
ence at the time of his death." The contest is purely one 
of presumptions and inferences. That the codicil was duly 
executed is established without question but, after the testa .. 
tor's death it' WM never found. No witness was produced 
who claim~d (or admitted) to have seen such lost codicil 
after the day of its execution nor, on the other hand, to have 
seen the testator destroy it or to have heard him declare 
that it had been revoked. There is evidence which, on the cold 
pages of the record, appeals' to reMon M supporting the 
conclusion that the codicil was destroyed by the testator, but 
a critical consideration of the entire record impels us to the 
conviction that the circumstances depicted are not devoid of 
substantially conflicting inferences. [1] The rules of evi-
dence the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and the, 
provi~ce of a reviewing court, are the same ina will contest 
as in any other civil case. (Estate of SnowbalZ (1910), 157 
Cal. 301, 305 [107 P. 598] ; Estate of Barr (1924), 69 Cal. 
App. 16, 33 [230 P. 181].) [2] The rule as to our prov-
ince is: "In reviewing the evidence ... all conflicts must be 
resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and 
reMonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if 
possible. It is an elementary ... principle of law, that when 
a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the 
appellate court begins and ends with a determination M to 
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or 
uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached 
by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reMonably 
deduced from the facts, the reviewing ~ourt is without power 
to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court." 
(Italics added.) (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935), 
3 CaL2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 1831.) The rule quoted is as 
applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when 
considering a jury's verdict. The critical word in the defi-
nition is " substantial" j it is a door which can lead as readily 
to abuse as to practical or enlightened justice. [3] It, is 
COlnmon knowledge among judges and lawyers that many 
cases are determined to the entire satisfaction of trial judges 
or juries, on their factual issues, by evidence which is over-
whelming in its persuasiveness but which may appear rela-, 
tively unsubstantial-if it can be reflected at all-in a phono-
graphic record. Appellate courts, therefore, if there be any 
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reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the 
finding; and in searching the record and exploring the in-
ferences which may arise from what is found there, to dis-
cover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court should 
be realistic and practical. Upon such view of the law we 
cannot hold that any essential finding in this case is unsup-
ported. 
Appellant-contestant relies upon the rule stated in section 
350 of the Probate Code that "No will shall be proven as a 
lost or destroyed will unless proved to have been in existence 
at the time of the death of the testator, or shown to have been 
destroyed fraudulently or by public calamity in the lifetime 
of the testator, without his knowledge," and upon the pre-
sumption which has been declared by this court (Estate of 
Sweetman (1921), 185 Cal. 27, 28 [195 P. 918]; Estate of 
Johnston (1922), 188 .Ca1. 336, 340 [206 P. 628)), and 
which is well stated in 26 California Jurisprudence 807, sec-
tion 141, that "Where the evidence shows that the instru-
ment cannot be found, and that when last seen or known to 
exist it was in the custody or possession of the decedent, the 
conclusion of law is that the writing was destroyed by the 
decedent, and that he acted with the intention of effecting 
a revocation thereof." Presenting the other side of the con-
troversy, respondent calls attention to the legal proposition 
that the burden of proof was on appellant-contestant and 
urges that the circumstances shown are sufficient to at least 
balance, and therefore to overcome, the presumption invoked 
by appellant, through raising inferences that the decedent 
never destroyed or revoked the codicil, that he believed at 
the time of his last illness that it was still in existence, and 
that in fact it was in existence at the time of his demise. 
[4] It should be noted that the above-quoted presumption 
which is relied upon by appellant-contestant is qualified by 
the further statement in 26 California JurisprUdence at page 
807, in section 141, that "Nothing else appearing, the ad-
mission of the writing to probate as a lost or destroyed will 
must be denied. However, the proponent may secure the 
admission of the instrument by presenting evidence which 
rebuts the conclusion or presumption that arises from the 
facts of possession by the decedent and loss or disappearance. 
. .. It follows that the proponent is entitled to a favorable 
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probable (1) that the will was destroyed by another person 
than the decedent, or (2) that the act was not done with an 
intention to revoke the instrument." (Italics added.) 
The mooted codicil was referred to by the parties through-
out the trial as the "lost codicil" and will be so designated 
in this opinion. Viewing the evidence in aspects most favor-
able to sustaining the attacked finding (Von Breton v. Hick$ 
(1942), 55 Cal.App.2d 909, 912 [131 P.2d 560)), the facts 
appear as hereinafter narrated. 
Luther Bristol successfully raised a family of five chil-
dren, including four sons and one daughter, Edith Bristol 
Young, the respondent-proponent herein, and accumulated a 
modest fortune. Late in life, apparently having lost his first 
wife, the mother of his children, he took to wife Agnes Bris-
tol, many years his junior. This latter marriage did not· 
produce an altogether harmonious union. It was punctuated 
by a separate maintenance action filed by Agnes, by Ii. cross-
complaint for divorce filed by Luther, by an amended com· 
plaint on the part of Agnes also seeking a divorce, and bya 
rescission suit instituted· by Luther in which he sought to 
recover from Agnes certain income-producing real property 
which he had deeded to her. The divorce litigation ended 
in an impasse in which neither party was granted a decree 
and the rescission action was dismissed in reliance upon a 
false representation by Agnes which will shortly be referred 
to again. The principal result of the controversy being liti-
gated is the determination of whether Agnes, the widow, or 
Edith, the daughter, shall administel," the affairs of the estate, 
and whether a crippled granddaughter, Rita, who appears to 
have been definitely in Luther's affections, shall inherit· a 
share of the estate. . 
Luther died on September 30, 1942, at an age of more 
than ninety-three years. Three testamentary documents are 
involved in the proceedings: (1) a '''Last Will and Testa-
ment of Luther Bristol," dated April I, 1938, executed when 
the testator was approximately ninety years of age (and ap-
parently shortly after the marriage to Agnes, the exact date 
of which does not appear); (2) a "Codicil to My Will· Dated 
April I, 1938," itself bearing the date of July 28, 1939; and 
(3) the lost codicil, dated April 28, 1941. Another instru-
ment, admittedly lacking testamentary competence, was found 
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~otary publi~ who thus futilely assumed to engage unlawfully 
1~ the prac~ICe of law, but aside from some possible eviden-
tiary value III the proof of intent-which the trial court found 
nonpersuasive-it has no significance here. 
There is no contest as to the will of April 1 1938 nor as 
to the codicil of July 28, 1939. The issue is' joined solely 
~s .to the codicil of April 28, 1941-the "lost codicil." And 
It IS not as to the. fact ~f its original due execution but only 
as to the fact of ItS eXIstence at the time of Luther's death 
that there is conflict. By the original will of April 1 1938 
A~nes, the newly acquired wife, was nominated ex;cutri~ 
WIthout b?nd, she wa.s devised certain income-producing real 
pro~erty I~proved WIth ~ four-unit flat building and a single 
famIl:v reSIdence, and, WIth the testator's children, was made 
a reSIduary legatee. The codicil of JUly 28 1939 revised 
the original will (of April 1, 1938) only as t~ prov'ision for 
the t~stator 's son Walter and his granddaughters Ruth and 
Be:ll1ce Olsen: It d~es not affect the interests of either Agnes 
~~Istol or EdIth BrIstol Young and has no significance in the 
htlgated controversy except as it may tend to depict the scru-
p~lous car~ and concern which the testator manifested for 
hIs own chIldren and their children. 
Th~ lost codicil (of April 28, 1941), however, effects sub. 
stantI~1 changes in. ~he te~tamentary plan. Subsequent to 
eXe?~tlOn of the orlgmal will of April 1, 1938, and the first 
COdICIl of JUly 2~, 1939, Mr. Bristol had deeded to Agnes the 
real. property whICh had been the subject of his testamentary 
deVIse to her, and he had learned that his beloved grand. 
daught~r, Rita Fox, was not deceased, as had been believed 
a~ the time of execution of the earlier documents. (Rita had 
dlsappe~red. and ;emained absent from her family without 
commull1c~tmg WIth t~em for an extended period; she re-
t~rned prlOr to executlOn of the lost codicil.) The lost codi-
CIl revoked the provision of the original will devising to Agnes 
the subsequently deeded property, revoked the nomination 
of .Agnes to act as executrix without bond, nominated Edith 
BrIstol Y ou.ng as executrix in place of Agnes, and added the 
na~e of RIta Fox (daughter of the testator's son Walter 
BrI~t?l) to those of the granddaughters designated in the 
c.od~CII of ~uly 28, 1939, to share in the remainder of the 
lImIted de~Ise ~o. Walter. The original will also made testa-
mentary dIspOSItion of certain parcels and items of property 
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appears that deeds conveying the real property to the chilo 
dren in general accord with the testamentary plan were also 
prepared and signed but were not delivered during the tes-
tator's lifetime. Such deeds, together with the original will 
and first codicil (and the abortive attempt at a cod~cil typed 
on the first codicil by the notary public) were found in the 
testator's safety deposit box after his demise. The lost codi-
cil, so far as appears, was never placed in the safety deposit 
box. It was last seen, so far as claimed or admitted by any 
witness, at the time the testator placed it in his pocket after 
its execution. 
The evidence tends to show that Mr. Bristol, after executing 
the lost codicil, never changed his mind as to providing for 
Rita, the returned granddaughter, or as to revoking the de-
vise of the income property which had been deeded to Agnes, 
or as to appointing the daughter, Edith Bristol Young, as 
executrix. Mr. Bristol apparently was of sound and dispos-
ing mind up to within a few hours of his death. 
[5] Until a few days before his passing, Mr. Bristol kept 
on his body a money belt in which he had deposited $5,950. 
This money at that time, in his presence, by his direction, 
and in the presence of others of the family, was handed to 
Mr. Charles G. Young, the husband of Edith, and a member 
of the bar, for safekeeping. While nO oral statement was 
made specifying in words that this money was entrusted to 
Mr. Young because his wife (Mr. Bristol's daughter) Edith 
was, by the terms of the lost codicil, to be the executrix of 
Mr. Bristol '8 will, the reticence of those participating in thE! 
conversation to speak bluntly concerning such matters at that 
time is easily understandable and the inference which the 
trial judge drew from the circumstances, to the effect that 
such was the object, the intent, and. the understanding of the 
parties, is a reasonable one. 
It is noteworthy that the petition for probate of the lost 
codicil expressly charges that such lost codicil "has never 
been revoked and was in exisience at the time of the testa-
tor's death, but was destroyed and petitioner alleges on in-
formation and belief that said codicil was destroyed by Agnes 
Bristol, the surviving wife of the deceased." (Italics added.) 
Nowhere in the record does it appear that Agnes as a wit-
ness expressly or specifically or directly denied this charge. 
There is testimony that at a time eight days before Mr. Bris· 
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tol's death, during his last illness, and after members of his 
family had been called to his bedside, Agnes said "if she 
could ever get her fingers on the will and the deeds she 
would tear them all up except Walter's." 
That Agnes had knowledge of the lost codicil, and of its 
contents and potential effect, is established. Mr. Bristol him-
self, in the presence of his attorney, told her that he had 
"changed" his will and that "Edith is going to be the execu-
trix. ' , He said to her: "Why, Mrs. Bristol,' you would not 
put a loan on this property? ... I have given you that and 
that is all you are going to get out of my estate ... I' have 
told you that I have changed my will, and that Edith is go-
ing to be the executrix, and that you are to have the prop-
erty to provide for yourself the rest of your life ... If you 
are going to make a loan on that property, I will not permit 
Mr. Lake to dismiss this case." (Italics added.) While some 
o! the testimon! of Agnes appears to have been posi-
tr~e . and emphatIc to the degree of the dramatic, that per-
tammg to her knowledge of the lost codicil apparently was 
nei~her pos~tive nor conv~ncing to the trial judge. By way 
OT. IllustratIOn the followmg questions and answers are in-
formative: 
"Q. And did you ever see either in my office or in the 
possession of Mr. Bristol or about the home of yourself and 
Mr. Bristol, a codicil to his will which had been prepared 
by meY 
"A. I don't think I have, Mr. Lake. 
"Q. In other words, as far as you now recall you never 
saw that document at any time? 
"A. I do not think so." (Italics added.) 
To an extent seldom seen in a record that before us in 
this case discloses on the part of Agnes Bristol, as a witness 
an apparent determination to evade direct and forthright 
answers to pertinent questions. Repeatedly, through many 
~ages of tra~s?ript, the trial judge is shown to have pa-
tIently a~d dIlIgently, and by necessity, admonished her to 
answer dIrectly and responsively material questions properly 
ad~ressed to her. The recitals as to money and property 
WhICh Agnes procured from Mr. Bristol at the time of and 
after her . marriage to him, and the method she employed on 
on~ occasIon, leave no doubt as to the legal sufficiency of the 
eVIdence to support a possible conclusion of the trial judge 
that the procurement of money and property from Mr. Bris-
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tol was a motivating influence in Agnes' life and that she 
would not necessarily permit compunctions of honesty to 
deter her pursuit of the end sought. 
The title to the income property which Mr. Bristol deeded 
to Agnes was clear and apparently he was insistent that it 
be kept clear of encumbrances. She also promised that she 
would not sell the property. When questioned as to whether 
she had falsified to Mr. Bristol concerning the procurement 
of a loan on this property contrary to his admomtions, Agnes 
at first denied that she had placed an encumbrance upon it. 
She testified, "I did not, I sold it, I didn't put a loan, I sold 
it." The following questions and answers then appear: 
"THE COURT: The question is, did you tell your husband 
that you were or were not putting a loan on it, what did you 
tell your husband about a loan? 
"A. I put a loan on first, and then I saw that I would lose 
the property, I could not make expenses and I sold it. 
"Q. By MR. LAKE: . . . My question is, at the time that 
you came to my office for me to sign this dismissal, when I 
told Mr. Bristol that you were trying to put a loan on the 
property, isn't it a fact that you turned to him and said, 
'I am not, I have no intention of putting a loan on this 
property'? 
"A. Well, I did not at that time, because there was already 
a loan on it, Mr. Lake. 
"Q. I am not questioning whether. o;t" not there :was a loan, 
did you tell Mr. Bristol that you had no iD.tention of putting 
a loan on this property Y . 
"A. Yes. "." 
The object of the deceit disclosed. by the .abov.e~uoted 
questions and answers becomes the morEl, apparent. upon, men. 
tion of the fact that, as disclosed by!the.record; the ob~ 
ject of the call of Agnes and Luther BriStol at the office of 
his attorney, when the quoted conversation took place, was to 
secure a dismissal of the rescission suit which had been filed 
by Mr. Bristol and which clouded the otherwise clear title of 
Agnes to the property. Agnes' application for a loan on the 
property was then pending and the title company had re-
quested the dismissal of the suit with.its accompanying notice 
of lis pendens. Mr. Bristol had no knowledge of the real 
object of Agnes in seeking the dismissal, and in r~liance upon 
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structerl his attorney todisrniss the suit. The dismissal was 
filed. The loan was effected. 
Concerning the subsequent sale of the hypothecated prop-
erty the testimony of Agnes is on the same plane. She at 
first asserted that she had sold it for "about $4000" and 
under the probing of cross-examination finally admitted re-
ceiving a price of $5,500 for it. Her testimony concerning 
the regard and intentions of Mr. Bristol for his granddaugh-
ter Rita is also enlightening. It will be recalled that neither 
in the original will nor in the first codicil was any provision 
made for Rita, it being believed that she was no longer liv-
ing. Only in the lost codicil, executed after her return, does 
her name appear. The significant testimony is as follows: 
"Q. Did you ever hear Mr. Bristol say anything about 
Rita Fox, that he wanted her to be a beneficiary under 
his estate? 
"A. She is one of his granddaughters. 
"Q. That' is not what I asked you, did you ever hear him 
say that he wanted her to participate in the distribution of 
his estate' 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And you also heard the conversation that he had with 
his daughter, Edith, before his death, in which he told her, 
and there was some discussion about him including Rita as 
a beneficiary in his estate, wasn't there? 
"A. Yes. 
I I Q. And he mentioned the fact that he had included her 
as one of the beneficiaries, didn't he Y 
"A. Sure. 
"' Q. And you knew that right up to the time of his death 
that that was his thought and that was his desire, that Rit~ 
would benefit, isn't that right? 
" A. Well, she is his great-granddaughter [sic]." 
.The above-quoted testimony obviously depicts a state of 
mmd of the testator which the trial judge could well have 
~oncluded, was. consistent only with the lost codicil's being, 
m Luther s behef, unrevoked and potentially operative. There 
is other evidence in the record, cumulative or corroborative in 
eff~ct, which like~ise tends to show the propensities of Agnes 
BrIstol and the mterests of Luther Bristol, but enough has 
been delineated to require us to hold that the determination 
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of the trial court was based on. substantially. conflicting in-
ferences and hence is conclusive. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter; J., concur~ed. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. There is, noeviden.ce in the 
present case to support the finding that the codicil was in 
existence at the time of the testator's death. No .one saw.the 
codicil after its execution and delivery to the testator on 
April 28, 1941. It did not appear amongst the, papers that 
the testator kept in his safe-deposit box in. which was found 
after his death, the will of April 1, 1938, a codicil of Juiy 
'28, 1939, a so-called I I Second Codicil" not legally executed; 
and deeds to his children. There is no explanation for its 
disappearance between the time' of its execution and the 
death of the testator. No claim is advanced that it was. 
destroyed by public calamity, and any contention that the 
appellant fraudulently destroyed it in the testatoris lifetime is 
dispelled by the trial court's finding that it was in existence 
at the time of his death. 
The respondent relies upon evidence with regard first to 
a conversation between herself and the testator concerning 
Rita Fox, then to the delivery of testator's money belt to 
respondent's husband, and finally to a conversation between 
appellant and Mrs. Della Bristol, to prove the existence of 
the codicil at the testator's death. 
In the first codicil the testator's son Walter was given a 
life estate in certain real property, with remainder to two 
of Walter's daughters. A third daughter, Rita, who had 
disappeared and not been heard from, was not given an in-
terest in the remainder in vIew of the understanding, that 
her two sisters would execute an agreement giving her an 
equal interest should she return. Rita returned and the lost 
codicil gave her an interest in the remainder equal to that 
of each of her two sisters. Some time after the execution of 
this codicil respondent had a conversation with the testator, 
as to which respondent testified as follows: "Q. What did 
he say? A. Well, he said, 'I must fix it so Rita can get hers,' 
and I said, 'Why, dad, don't you remember, you had Mr. 
Lake fix that up.' He said, "Oh, I had forgotten all about it.' 
He was getting very forgetful, he could not seem to remember 
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those things. Q. That was two months prior to his death Y 
A. Yes, two or three months. Q. Could it have been as early 
as February of this year 1 A. Well, it might have been, it 
was February-I was over there February 20th, my son was 
home on furlough and he and I went over to see his grandpa. 
Q. Then when is the next time you went over Y A. I went 
over about every two or three weeks. Q. Your recollection 
is now that this conversation about Rita Fox took place-
A. After February. Q. And about two months before Sep-
tember 30th f A. Well, it might have been longer, it is in 
there between those dates. Q. By THE COURT: What was it 
you said about the matter having been taken care of for Rita? 
A. You see, she had disappeared and he had forgotten that 
he had Mr. Lake fix up that codicil naming her, and he said, 
'Did Charley ever have those girls sign a paper that would 
give her her share?' He said, 'I want her to have her share. ' 
And I said, 'Why, Dad, you had that fixed up in Mr. Lake's 
ofiice. ' Q. What did he say about it Y A. He just said that 
he had forgotten about it, that he wanted to make sure that 
Rita was going to get her part of it. Q. By MR. LAKE: And 
when you mentioned the fact that he had taken care of it in 
my office, what did he say1 A. Just that it had slipped his 
memory, that he had forgotten all about it." 
This evidence given its utmost weight would prove only 
that the testator believed that the codicil was in existence 
at the date of the conversation some two or three months 
before his death. It in no way proves that the codicil was 
in existence when the testator died, or even that at any time 
after the conversation he did not revoke the codicil. 
The testator at all times wore a belt containing a large 
sum of money. Two or three days before his death, after 
respondent had warned him of the danger of keeping the 
money belt on, the testator delivered it to respondent's hus-
band, Mr. Charles G. Young, for safekeeping. Mr. Young 
placed the money in his safe-deposit box and properly ac-
counted for it after the testator's death. There is nothing 
in this evidence that has any bearing upon the existence of 
the lost codicil at the time of the testator's death. It is 
apparently the view of l'espondent that since the testator 
named her as executrix in the lost codicil, he confirmed that 
choice when he turned over his money belt to her husband, 
Mr. Charles G. Young, for safekeeping. There is nothing in 
the record, however, to indicate that the testator was think-
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ing in terms of the administration of his estate or that he 
turned his money belt over to Mr. Young, who was not only 
decedent's son-in-law but an attorney, rather than to any 
one else for any other reason than that he could ~rust Mr. 
Young with its safekeeping during his illness. . . . 
According to the testimony of Mrs. Della Brls~ol, the Wlfe 
of one of the testator's sons, the appellant made the statem~~t 
to hEn' eight days before the death of the ~estator that . if 
she could get her fingers on the will andth~ deedss~e would 
tear them all up except Walter's." There is nOFhmg here 
to suggest that the will was in existence at the tIme of the 
testator's death. Nor would this evidence by itself support 
a finding that appellant destroyed the c?dicil, and th~re is 
no indication in the findings that she dId so. There IS no 
evidence that she ever saw the codicil or had any opportu-
nity to destroy it. The bank records show that no one but 
the testator ever had access to the testator's safe-deposit box 
in which he kept his valuable papers, and in which the will, 
the first codicil codicil number two, and the deeds were found 
after his death. Appellant's character, however it is evalu-
ated and her motives however suspicious they may appear, 
can~ot stand as proof of the fraudulent destruction of the 
will when there are no facts or circumstances that make such 
a destruction plausible. Her own testimony did nothing to 
establish such a destruction, and it is therefore immaterial 
whether or not the trial court believed her, for a fact is 
proved by affirmative evidence, not by disbelief of a witness. 
(Moulton v. Moulton, 178 Minn. 568 [227 N.W. 896] ; Hyslop 
v. Boston & Me. Ry., 208 Mass. 362 [94 N.E. 310; 21 Ann. 
Cas. 1121] ; Boice-Perrine Co. v. Kelley, 243 Mass. 327 [137 
N.E. 731] ; see 23 C.J. 51; 32 C.J.S. 1134.) 
A finding of fact cannot be sustained if no evidence ap-
pears in the record from which the trier of facts could ~ea­
sonably infer that it is more probable that the fact eXISts 
than that it does not. The suggestion in the. majorityopin-
ion that evidence may be overwhelming in its persuasiveness 
even though it "may appear relatively unSubstantial-if .it 
can be reflected at all-in a phonographic record" is. in effect 
a suggestion that an appellate court may disregard the mani-
fest unpersuasiveness of the evidence it is charged to review .. 
If an appellate court could attribute reality to the phantom 
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would no longer be bound by the record itself and could even 
affirm a jUdgment that was not sustained by any proof. 
The relation, between the presumption of revocation, in-
voked in the majority opinion, to Probate Code section 350 
requires clarification. Section 350 of the Probate Code pro-
vides: "No will shall be proven as a lost or destroyed will 
unless proved to have been in existence at the time of the 
death of the testator, or shown to have been destroyed ftaud-
lently or by public calamity in the lifetime of the testator, 
without his knowledge." Some confusion has attended the 
application of this section since the majority opinion in Es-
tate of Sweetman, 185 Cal. 27 [195 P. 918], first invoked the 
presumption that a will has been revoked when it is known 
to have been in the possession of the decedent but cannot be 
found after his death. Apparently the presumption was re-
garded as arising independently of section 1339 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, the antecedent of Probate Code section 
350, for the will was admitted to probate not simply because 
the declarations of the testatrix showed that she had not re-
voked it and thus had the effect of overcoming the presump-
tion (185 Cal. 27, 33), but also because under section 1963, 
subdivision 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a thing once 
shown to be in existence is presumed to continue in existence 
so long as things of that nature usually exist. (185 Cal. 27, 
34.) It would not have been necessary to invoke the pre-
sumption of continued existence if in the opinion of the 
majority, the requirements of section 1339 had been satisfied 
by proof of nonrevocation. In a vigorous dissent, Justice 
Olney' took the view that proof of nonrevocation was imma-
terial, since existence of the will at the time of the testator's 
death had to be established, and that the very purpose of 
section 1339 was "to make it impossible to probate an un-
produced will by proof that it was in existence prior to the 
testator's death eked out by any presumption that it con-
tinued to exist until he died." 
Subsequently in Estate of Ross, 199 Cal. 641, 647, 648 
[250 P. 676], the court overruled the holding in Estate of 
Sweetman that a will once in existence is presumed to con-
tinue in existence, declaring: "If the rule were otherwise 
all that would be necessary in order to prove a lost or de-
stroyed will would be to show that the will was in the pos-
session of the testatrix some time, any time, prior to her 
death with no apparent intervening cause for destruction 
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or revocation, and thus rebut the presumption of revocation 
and entirely nullify the requirements of said section 1339." 
Without the presumption of continued existence the order 
admitting the will to probate could not have been affirmed 
in the Sweetman case, for. there was nothing else to prove 
the existence of the will at the time of the death of the tes-
tatrix. Nothing in that case, therefore, affords any 'support' 
for the proposition that proof of nonrevocation alone is'suffi.J 
cient to comply with Probate Code section 350. '. '. ' 
While the overruling of Estate of" Sweetman did much' to 
dispel the confusion engendered by that case, the relation of 
Probate Code section 350 to the presumption of revocation 
that is said to arise in these cases still requires ,clarification. 
If section 350 provided simply that a presumption of revoca-
tion arises in the case of a lost will, it would be ,necessary 
only to rebut the presumption to prove that the will was in 
existence at the time of the testator's death. A. presumption 
of revocation independent of section 350 becomes superfluous, 
however if the very existence of the will at the time of the. , . 
testator's death must be proved. While proof of that eXISt-
ence establishes the fact of nonrevocation, th.e converse does 
not follow that a will exists because there is no revocation 
thereof. It would therefore be idle to rebut the presumption 
of revocation if there were no proof that a will existed at the 
time of the testator's death. 
Section 350 cannot reasonably be construed as creating a 
presumption of revocation. It is concerned; not with the rules 
governing revocation, which are specifically set forth in sec..: 
tion 74 of the Probate Code, but with the procedure for es-
tablishing a lost or destroyed will. (Estate of Patterson, 155 
Cal. 626, 633-638 [102 P. 941, 132 Am.St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann. 
Cas. 625,26 L.R.A.N.S. 654].) Compliance with the sub-
stantive provisions that determine the status of the will as 
an executed instrument is not enough to render the will op-
erative as a conveyance. A will cannot be given in evidence 
as the foundation of a right or title unless it has been duly 
probated (Estate of Patterson, 155 Cal. 626, 636 [102 P: 
941, 132 Am.St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann. Cas. 625, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 
654]), and section 350 prescribes the requirements that must 
be satisfied before a lost will can be probated. It is' there-
fore not controlling that under the substantive provisions of 
the law, the will has been duly executed arid has not been 
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scribed in the code for the probate of wills cannot be met. 
The requirement of proof that the will existed at the time of 
the testator's death cannot be translated into a requirement 
of proof of nonrevocation. Such a translation would render 
meaningless the provision regarding wills destroyed fraud-
ulently or by public calamity, for under Probate Code sec-
tion 74 there can be no revocation under such circumstances. 
Indeed, the amendment with respect to wills destroyed by 
public calamity was held applicable in Estate of Patterson, 
155 Cal. 626 [102 P. 941, 132 Am.St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann.Cas. 
625, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 654], to a will destroyed before the adop-
tion of the amendment, on the ground that the will had not 
been revoked. Had the destruction amounted to a revocation 
of the will, the estate would have vested in the heirs and the 
subsequent amendment could not have served to take the 
estate from them. Since the probate procedure related simply 
to the remedy and not to the foundation of the rights of 
those claiming under the will, the amendment was held ap-
plicable. The will was admitted to probate, not simply be-
cause it was unrevoked, but because by virtue of the amend-
ment a will destroyed by public calamity without the knowl-
edge of the testator could be probated even though it was 
admittedly not in existence at the time of the death of the 
testator. 
In section 350 of the Probate Code, the Legislature has 
exercised the greatest caution not to leave the way open for 
the establishment of spurious wills or the probate of wills 
that testators have intentionally destroyed without leaving 
adequate proof of such destruction, even going so far as to 
preclude probate of a will that is lost or destroyed, other 
than by fraud or public calamity, before the death of the 
testator. (Estate of Johnson, 134 Cal. 662 [66 P. 847]; 
Estate of Patterson, supra; Estate of Kidder, 57 Cal. 282.) 
It has placed upon the testator the responsibility for the 
safekeeping of his will until his death. At the same time it 
has recognized that once the testator dies there is greater 
risk of loss or destruction of his will, and it has therefore 
sought to insure that his wishes would nonetheless be carried 
out, by providing that his will need not be in existence at the 
time of probate so long as there is proof of its existence at 
the time of death and proof by two witnesses of its provisions. 
It is for the Legislature to choose or modify the course it 
deems proper in this regard, not for the court to undertake 
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modifications merely because in its view the Legislature has 
acted in excess of caution. 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 27, 1943. Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted 
for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 18357. In Bank. Dec. 2, 1943.] 
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[1] Automobiles-Actions-Province of Court and Jury-Negli-
gence of Operator-Excessive Speed.-In an action for in-
juries sustained by an occupant of an automobile when it 
skidded off a wet road, the slippery condition of which was 
partly caused by the sap of adjacent eucalyptus trees, where 
there was testimony that, shortly before the accident, the car 
was traveling between 55 and 60 miles an hour and that 
plaintiff had cautioned defendant against driving so fast, and 
where a traffic officer testified that any person who would 
drive on that road over 30 miles an hour would be endanger-
ing the lives of those in the car, the evidence of negligence 
was sufficient to take the case to the jury, and a judgment 
of dismissal could not be sustained on the ground of failure 
to prove lack of due care. 
[2] Id. - Actions - Guest Law-Status of Injured Occupant.-
In an action for injuries sustained by an occupant of an 
automobile who claims that defendant driver was guilty only 
of ordinary negligence, plaintiff must establish that she did 
not accept the ride as a guest without giving compensation 
therefor, within the meaning of Veh. Code, § 403. 
[3] Id.-Conduct of Operator-Care as to Guests-Who are 
[3] Who is a guest or entitled to benefit of "guest" 'statute, 
notes, 82 A.L.R. 1365; 95 A.L.R. 1180; 109 A.L.R. 667. See, also, 
2 Ca1.Jur. Ten-Year Supp. 541; 5 Am.Jur. 632. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 275; [2] Automobiles, 
§ 194; [3-8, 11] Automobiles, § 123(2); [9, 10] Automobiles, 
§ 123(1). 
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